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    The Virtue of Vice: A Defence of Hypocrisy in Democratic Politics 
     D. Tillyris 
 
Abstract 
This essay suggests that Machiavelli’s claim that the moral vice of hypocrisy is 
inescapable in politics constitutes a real issue for democratic politics today. Indeed, it 
concludes that democratic societies are implicated in creating the impetus to 
hypocritical behaviour. The essay questions the prevalent conviction that a liberal 
democratic polity should be premised on transparency and candour, not on hypocritical 
manipulation – a conviction which is paradoxically shared by the dirty hands thesis 
which is mostly owed to Michael Walzer and which purportedly takes Machiavelli’s 
insights on the moral messiness of politics seriously. Attempts to deny the necessity of 
political hypocrisy misconstrue the realities of democratic politics – the messy context 
in which politicians operate and what is distinctive of political friendships. Democratic 
politicians operate in a context ridden with conflict and dependence which renders 
hypocrisy a necessary political virtue and one of the strings that hold together a 
virtuous political life. 
 
Keywords Machiavelli, hypocrisy, political virtue, moral conflict, democratic politics, 
dirty hands 
 
‘It is necessary to a prince’, Machiavelli wrote, to learn how ‘not to be good’: practitioners of 
politics should cultivate and exhibit certain ordinary vices – the cruelty of the lion and the 
dissimulation and hypocrisy of the fox (1998, XV: 61; XVIII – XIX). Whilst philosophers 
have expended a lot of energy trying to explain, vindicate or admonish Machiavelli’s general 
teachings, they have paid little attention to his particular insights on political hypocrisy and 
their relevance to our seemingly mundane democratic politics1. 
 
Yet, hypocrisy is ubiquitous in politics. The problem, however, is not just that hypocrites 
abound. The question is to discern what to do with hypocrisy and with those who practice it. 
For some philosophers and commentators, this question welcomes a pithy answer. 
‘Hypocrisy’, Judith Shklar observes, ‘remains the only unforgivable sin, especially among 
                                            
1
 There are exceptions to this, but even those who defend political hypocrisy in contemporary 
democracies (i.e. Shklar and Runciman) distance themselves from Machiavelli’s thought. Shklar 
(1984) perceives Machiavelli as an enemy of liberal democracy and Runciman (2008) suggests that it 
is easier to capture the problem of hypocrisy by drawing on the resources of liberalism. My reading of 
Machiavelli suggests that his thought has more affinities with Shklar’s and Runciman’s liberal realism 
than they assume. Amongst the few philosophers who read Machiavelli along these lines is Ruth Grant 
(1997). However, unlike Grant, I argue that Machiavelli’s defence of hypocrisy is grounded on his 
conception of politics as a distinct practice and way of life, with its own goods and standards of 
excellence. Moreover, contra Grant, adequately capturing political reality does not just entail 
acknowledging the existence of plural, conflicting interests but also the existence of a plurality of 
antagonistic and incompatible conceptions of the good and aspirations. It is because of this deep 
pluralism, I claim, that hypocrisy is inescapable. Finally, unlike Grant, I maintain that hypocrisy, 
whilst uncongenial to moral integrity or the consistency of the saint, forms a crucial aspect of political 
integrity – the glue that holds together a virtuous political life. 
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those who can overlook and explain almost every vice’ (1984: 45). The desire to extirpate 
hypocrisy, David Runciman adds, features even in ‘the most sophisticated discussions of its 
role in liberal politics’ (2008: 196). These remarks, one could retort, are inflated with 
exaggeration. Yet, some of the recent public reactions to the hypocrisies of our politicians 
suggest otherwise. For instance, when Bill Clinton was reported having illicit sex, much of 
the public outrage was not directed against the cheating of his spouse: ‘it was the hypocrisy 
that bothered them’ (Waldron, 2011: 13 – 14). This aversion to hypocrisy is not just displayed 
by moralists who conceptualize democratic politics in too idealistic terms. Rather, it is even 
shared by some of their critics who profess to adopt a more realistic view of the moral 
messiness of politics – the proponents of the dirty hands thesis who purportedly build on 
Machiavelli’s teachings2. Whilst the dirty hands thesis claims to embrace Machiavelli’s 
recognition that political excellence might require the practice of certain vices, such as lying 
and even cruelty, it is paradoxically censorious over the practice of hypocrisy in democratic 
politics – or, at least, some of its core manifestations: the art of concealing one’s vices. 
 
This essay suggests that Machiavelli’s claim that hypocrisy is inescapable in politics, is not of 
an abstract, historical interest, but it constitutes a real issue for democratic politics today. 
Indeed, it concludes that democratic societies are implicated in creating the impetus to 
hypocritical behaviour. Democratic politicians operate in a messy context which renders 
hypocrisy a necessary political virtue and one of the strings that hold together a virtuous 
political life. 
 
Whilst I shall provide a more general consideration of hypocrisy, my defence of it will be 
fundamentally political3: it is couched on the recognition that making sense of political ethics 
requires us to conceive of politics as a distinct practice and way of life. Differently put, an 
adequate account of political ethics should give more autonomy to certain distinctively 
political concepts: we should consider more carefully the realities of politics, the goods which 
are intrinsic to a virtuous political life, the context in which politicians operate and the 
peculiar character of political friendships. It is, in short, certain inalienable features of 
political life – the struggle for power and the capacity to manoeuvre amidst a messy context 
characterized by perpetual conflict and dependence – which shape the standards of political 
                                            
2
 I use the term dirty hands thesis to refer to Walzer’s (1973) and Thompson’s (1989) position. 
3
 I do not deny that hypocrisy might be also displayed by ordinary citizens or that the hypocrisy and 
dirt of politicians are not shared by democratic citizens, but I focus on professional politicians. On 
hypocrisy and democratic citizenship, see Bellamy (2010), Shklar (1984), Hollis (1982) and Hatier 
(2012).  
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excellence and which render hypocrisy a necessary political virtue and an integral aspect of 
political integrity. To be clear, I do not deny that hypocrisy poses problems to our politics or 
that certain manifestations of it are dangerous for democratic politics – for instance, when 
democratic politicians hypocritically deny the abuse of public funds. Nor do I wish to suggest 
that democratic politics is impossible. Rather, I wish to carve room for hypocrisy in 
democratic politics. I want to argue that attempts to deny the necessity and value of political 
hypocrisy altogether, misconceive democratic politics; they misconstrue the standards of 
political excellence because they rest on an unsatisfactory idealization of the context in which 
democratic politicians operate and the nature of political friendships.    
 
My argument has crucial implications for the questions of how to conceptualize democratic 
politics and what it means to lead a virtuous political life in this context. It contributes to the 
recent claims that we are witnessing a moral crisis in political life – that, the shenanigans and 
immoralities of our politicians suggest that moral goodness has been displaced from 
democratic politics and should be, somehow, restored (Bunting, Lent & Vernon, 2010; 
Oborne, 2005; Sandel, 2010). My defence of hypocrisy suggests that this idealistic vision of 
democratic politics is inconceivable; the innocent quest to sanitize democratic politics and 
wriggle free from hypocrisy might have dire political implications. Further, my discussion 
contributes to the tradition of political realism. As suggested, whilst the appeal of this 
tradition stems from its rejection of moralism – a moralism which, I argue, also permeates the 
contemporary dirty hands thesis – political realists have said little on the more positive 
account of political ethics which emerges from their critiques (Galston, 2010; Horton, 2010). 
It is not my intention to provide an all-encompassing alternative to moralism here, but the 
argument I articulate is a nascent, more positive framework of political ethics which takes the 
grubbiness of politics seriously and which incorporates the realist concerns. In particular, 
whilst my case for hypocrisy builds on the realist tradition and has affinity with realist 
defences of this vice in public life (i.e. Shklar, 1984; Runciman, 2008; Grant, 1997), my claim 
that hypocrisy constitutes the glue that holds together a virtuous political life provides us with 
a novel insight on the nature of political integrity. Finally, my argument informs debates on 
the dirty hands problem; it uncovers a neglected divide in the dirty hands tradition: between 
those who subscribe to the moralistic way of thinking about hypocrisy and democratic politics 
(Michael Walzer and Dennis Thompson) and philosophers labelled as dirty hands theorists 
(Stuart Hampshire, Bernard Williams, Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis) who have a more 
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realistic understanding of democratic politics – one which takes Machiavelli’s insights on 
political friendship and conflict seriously. 
 
The discussion proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief illustration of hypocrisy. Second, I 
consider in more detail the way in which hypocrisy is typically received in the context of 
democratic politics, which is paradoxically shared by the dirty hands thesis: the hopeful claim 
that, at least in theory, democratic politics should be inhospitable to hypocrisy. I shall then 
upset this claim. I draw on Machiavelli’s insights on the realities of political life and political 
friendships and project these onto democratic politics. Political friendships are relationships 
of conflict and dependence: they are forged amongst public figures whose substantive 
interests and aspirations are plural, conflicting and irreconcilable and who may despise one 
another. In light of this recognition, I argue that hypocrisy constitutes a ‘lesser vice’, an 
inevitable by-product of our ordinary democratic practices and the glue that holds together 
political friendships and a virtuous political life. 
 
Hypocrisy: A Preliminary Consideration 
 
Without doubt, hypocrisy is an elusive concept. It is not my intention to provide an all-
encompassing definition of hypocrisy here, nor is it possible to do justice to philosophical 
debates on how to capture this vice. I merely want to sketch a particular type of hypocrisy 
which I shall defend as inescapable in democratic politics: Machiavelli’s calculated, cunning 
hypocrite4. I want to begin by highlighting the literal meaning of hypocrisy, which originates 
in theatre: hypocrisy meant to ‘pretend to be something one is not’ (Szabados & Soifer, 
2004). The ancient usage of the term has links with the modern understanding of hypocrisy, 
insofar as the language of the theatre remains central to our conception of it. It also explains 
some of the negative connotations the term acquired. For, in real-life, the audience is often 
unaware of what is being witnessed; individuals who play a part are untrustworthy: they hide 
behind the mask they wear (Runciman, 2008). Hence, playing a part whilst the audience is 
unaware of one’s acting is bound to involve some form of deception. 
 
The question which merits scrutiny though, concerns the point of the hypocrite’s deception. 
The prevalent conception of hypocrisy – which arises from the extension of the term from the 
theatre to avowals of religiosity by individuals who failed to practice what they preached – is 
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 Though other manifestations of hypocrisy might exist (i.e. the self-deceived, innocent hypocrite), I 
focus on the self-conscious, experienced hypocrite. 
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suggestive. Hypocrisy, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (1901), involves ‘a false 
appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character’. It is this type of 
hypocrisy Machiavelli defends in politics. For, whilst Machiavelli contends that a virtuous 
political life requires certain vices, he simultaneously suggests that a virtuous prince must be 
able to mimic the moral virtues and publically present himself as ‘all faith, all honesty, all 
humanity’ (1998, XVIII: 70). To be sure, hypocrisy can include ‘claims to consistency that 
one cannot sustain, claims to loyalty that one does not possess, claims to identity that one 
does not hold’ (Runciman, 2008: 8). What unites these manifestations of hypocrisy, though, is 
that its practitioners construct and publically display a persona which helps them to amass 
certain goods. This recognition brings to the fore a Machiavellian insight which I explore later 
on: satisfying certain distinctively political goods – goods which are intrinsic to politics – 
becomes impossible if the politician does not wear a mask of moral virtue. For, if one cannot 
and should not be perfectly virtuous in a domain in which moral virtue matters, the 
accumulation of certain political goods may be impossible without hypocritical dissimulation. 
 
Unlike other forms of dissimulation such as lying – which merely involves a false, short and 
dry statement advanced with an intention to deceive – what is distinctive of hypocrisy is that 
it does not just involve incongruence with the truth; the construction of a persona is meant ‘to 
convey an impression beyond the instant of the lie itself’ (Runciman, 2008: 9). The acting 
involved in creating a false impression turns on questions of character and is more enduring. 
The enduring nature of hypocrisy can also be glimpsed by highlighting its relationship with 
consistency. Even though hypocrisy is related to inconsistency, it is the commitment not to be 
inconsistent rather than inconsistency per se, that gives rise to hypocrisy – and this, I explain, 
constitutes one of the reasons why hypocrisy is inescapable in politics. And because 
hypocrisy involves a theatrical performance, the hypocrite’s acts can be more wide-ranging 
than those of the liar, whose repertoire of deceitful acts is rather limited. Whilst veracity and 
hypocrisy are often conceived as opposites (especially by critics of hypocrisy) the putting on 
of a theatrical act may encompass veracious statements. Consider, for example, Moliere’s 
Tartuffe, where the eponymous character manipulates Orgon by pretending to be a paragon of 
virtue. The discrepancy between hypocrisy and lying is evident in Tartuffe’s reaction to 
Damis’s (Orgon’s son) accusation that he is a scoundrel: ‘Yes, brother, I am wicked … The 
simple truth is, I’m a worthless creature’ (2001: 6). Tartuffe’s truthful confession that he is a 
conman does not amount to a genuine, transparent confession (Szabados & Soifer, 2004). 
Orgon’s reaction, who takes this confession as indicative of Tartuffe’s virtue, is suggestive: 
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he tries to earn Tartuffe’s forgiveness by offering him his fortune. Tartuffe’s truthfulness 
forms part of his plan to appropriate Orgon’s wealth; even though Tartuffe’s speech is 
veracious, the appearance of humility constitutes an aspect of his ‘performance’.  
 
That hypocrisy is (rightly) seen as the antithesis of innocence or moral goodness is 
unsurprising. ‘The virtuoso of hypocrisy’, Shklar writes, ‘is an experienced crook with a long 
criminal record’ (1984: 51). An experienced hypocrite is aware of his vices: what lies beneath 
his mask is clear-eyed. Putting on a theatrical act and exploiting others’ trust requires a 
capacity for manipulation and guile which innocent individuals lack. Nor is it surprising that 
hypocrisy is often derided as the ultimate vice. For, other vices – lying and cruelty for 
instance – are easier to detect (Shklar, 1984). Hypocrisy, in contrast, operates in two layers. 
As gestured following Machiavelli, hypocrisy is not just one of the necessary vices that 
politicians should cultivate whilst unlearning a portion of their virtue or relinquishing their 
innocence and exhibit for strategic purposes. It also forms a mechanism for concealing the 
rest of the vices. And, even though the masquerading of vice as virtue is problematic as it 
accumulates vice and limits our capacity to detect injustice, it is this function, I argue, which 
holds together a virtuous political life: the preservation of a moral front enables practitioners 
of politics, princely and democratic, to cultivate the support necessary for satisfying certain 
political goods – to marshal on amidst a domain ridden with conflict, in which mutual 
antipathies, immoralities, betrayals and inconsistencies are inescapable. Before elaborating on 
this, I shall sketch the typical, moralistic way of thinking about the relationship between 
hypocrisy and democratic politics. 
 
Hypocrisy and Democratic Politics: Some Contemporary Reflections. 
 
The position I have in mind is underpinned by the hopeful conviction that, in the context of 
democratic politics, ordinary and political morality can, at least in theory, be reconciled in a 
perfect and harmonious whole. Differently put, democratic politics is thought to be ethically 
superior to its alternatives, partly because it renders the vices in general and hypocrisy in 
particular unnecessary and undesirable. This moralistic vision of democratic politics lurks in 
the background of discussions of democratic theory (Dovi, 2007; Ramsay, 2000; Shugarman, 
2000; Cliffe et al, 2000), examinations of hypocrisy (McKinnon, 1991; Davidson, 2004) and 
recent attempts to revive moral virtue in political life (Bunting et al, 2010; Sandel, 2010; 
Oborne, 2005; 2011). At its core lie three arguments which sit well with our understanding of 
democracy and its value. The first argument postulates that, in democracies, governmental 
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power – and temptations for its misuse – must be controlled with accurate information. 
Hypocrisy, because of its affinity with concealment and deception, compromises these values. 
The second argument postulates that democratic government is a trust: since the people are 
the source of a government’s authority, the latter should be accountable to the former who 
must be aware of what politicians are doing or intend to do. Hypocrisy violates the 
relationship between the trustee and people. Finally, such arguments appeal to our ordinary 
democratic practices – in particular, the rituals of elections. In Peter Oborne’s words: 
 
Citizens … are entitled to be informed about their political choices.... 
Politicians who lie to voters deprive them of the ability to come to a well-
informed decision about how to cast their vote. In so doing, they convert 
them into dupes (2005: 120). 
 
The point of such rituals, as argued, is to enable citizens to reach an informed judgement and 
cast their vote; hypocrisy during political campaigns compromises such practices and the 
value of each citizen’s vote. These claims, I should add, are often accompanied by an explicit 
side-note that the shenanigans advocated by Machiavelli are not just undemocratic; they are 
also anachronistic. Machiavelli’s thought, Maureen Ramsay suggests, is ‘inappropriate to and 
outdated in the non-Machiavellian political context of relationships … within liberal 
democratic states’5 (2000: 159). What is striking, however, is that this conviction is shared by 
theorists who seek to upset the purity of this picture of democratic politics. The moralistic 
aspiration to extirpate political hypocrisy is espoused even by those who purport to present a 
messier, more realistic picture of democratic politics. This puzzling conviction is advanced by 
the modern dirty hands thesis which is mostly owned to Walzer. It is to the provision of a 
schematic sketch of that thesis and its insights on hypocrisy in democratic politics I now turn. 
 
Hypocrisy, Democratic Politics and the Dirty Hands Thesis 
 
To suggest that the dirty hands thesis sits well with the abovementioned moralistic conception 
of democratic politics seems to be a mistake. This is because of the purported lineage of the 
dirty hands thesis and a certain utopian vision which it is allegedly committed against. The 
key insight of the dirty hands thesis, Walzer explains, is traced to Machiavelli’s recognition 
that politicians should ‘learn how not to be good’ (1973: 164). This recognition relates ‘not 
only to the coherence and harmony of the moral universe, but also to the relative ease or 
                                            
5
 Defenders of Machiavelli’s insights in contemporary politics, Shugarman similarly argues, 
erroneously presuppose that politics ‘has changed little from the lawless, embattled atmosphere of 
Machiavelli’s Italy’ (2000: 231). 
8 
 
difficulty–or impossibility – of living a moral life’ (Walzer, 1973: 161). The dirty hands thesis 
suggests that the belief that morality and politics can coexist in a perfect, harmonious whole 
constitutes an idealistic delusion: it deforms our fragmented morality and the complex 
realities of politics. The key claim of that thesis, then, is that it takes the complexity of politics 
seriously. It acknowledges that, in certain inescapable circumstances, politicians might be 
required to act immorally and thus dirty their hands. For instance, they may have to lie and 
condone acts of cruelty. 
 
The affinity between Machiavelli’s thought and the dirty hands thesis is taken for granted (de 
Wijze, 2005; Shugarman, 2000; Philp, 2007; Hampshire, 1989). Indeed, it might appear that 
the latter constitutes an expression of Machiavelli’s insights in the democratic context. There 
exists, however, an overlooked rift between the two – the product of dirty hands theorists’ 
dissatisfaction with Machiavelli’s account– which is worth emphasizing. For, it raises the 
question as to whether the dirty hands thesis is, in fact, that different from the moralistic 
account of democratic politics to which it is often opposed. Machiavelli ‘is suspect’, Walzer 
says, ‘not because he tells political actors they must get their hands dirty’. Rather, the problem 
is that Machiavelli’s politician ‘is the sort of man who is unlikely to keep a diary and so we 
cannot find out what he thinks’. Yet, ‘we do want to know’ Walzer maintains: the democratic 
community is entitled to an open, transparent revelation of the politician’s dirt (1973: 176). 
The democratic context, the values of accountability, trust and transparency, should steer the 
politician to reveal his vices. Hence Walzer’s moral politician whom we, the people, know by 
his dirty hands: ‘if he were a moral man and nothing else’, Walzer argues, ‘his hands would 
not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else he would pretend that his hands were 
clean’ (1973: 168). What emerges from the dirty hands thesis, then, is an odd paradox: whilst 
it purportedly endorses Machiavelli’s recognition that politics, princely or otherwise, requires 
the practice of certain vices it seems allergic to the vice of hypocrisy in democratic politics. 
 
This peculiar distaste for hypocrisy is not restricted to Walzer’s account; it is also echoed in 
the earlier writings of Dennis Thompson: 
 
The vices of concealment – deception, secrecy and manipulation – are the 
most insidious of all … The possibility of judging dirty handed decisions – 
at least judging with any claim to democratic authority depends on keeping 
decisions clean in one respect. The wrongs they effect cannot include 
concealment that would preclude accountability (1989: 39). 
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Thus, the dirty hands thesis, which claims to take Machiavelli’s insights on the realities of 
politics and the fragmentation of morality seriously, does not stray from the popular 
moralistic way of conceiving hypocrisy and its relationship with democratic politics. 
Hypocrisy, on this view, is unnecessary and undesirable in democracies. The Machiavellian 
apologist of hypocrisy stands for a different conception of politics, one which is anachronistic 
and threatening to our democratic arrangements. Hypocrisy is anathema to democratic politics 
and its practice should be avoided. Or, so it is thought. 
 
In what follows, I shall vindicate Machiavelli’s insights on the necessity of political 
hypocrisy. The popular way of thinking about the relationship between hypocrisy and 
democratic politics, I argue, displaces the complex realities of democratic politics. It is 
underpinned by a vision of societal harmony which is inconceivable and which 
mischaracterizes the messy context in which democratic politicians operate and the peculiarity 
of political friendships; as such, it also misconstrues the standards of political excellence and 
what it means to lead a virtuous political life in the contemporary democratic context. Even 
though hypocrisy poses serious challenges to democratic politics, democratic societies, 
partially by virtue of some of the values and practices its critics invoke to vilify it, are 
implicated in creating the impetus to it.  
 
The Political Virtue of Hypocrisy 
 
Machiavelli’s case for hypocrisy is premised on the recognition that making sense of political 
virtue (virtù) requires us to approach politics as a distinct way of life –as an on-going activity 
with its own peculiar demands and standards of excellence6. It is on this point I shall build 
here. Hypocrisy, I argue, is crucial in securing certain distinct political goods (i.e. order, 
stability, trust and power) and in sustaining a virtuous political life; it constitutes the glue that 
holds a virtuous political life together as its effective practice enables politicians to rise to 
power and remain in it.  
 
What I shall additionally emphasize, is that because for Machiavelli, the standards of political 
excellence arise from within politics, his political ethic in general and defence of hypocrisy in 
particular go to the heart of the grubby context in which politicians operate and the peculiar 
nature of political friendships. If it can be illustrated that transparency and candour are not 
                                            
6
 Pace Alasdair MacIntyre (2003), questions of character and virtue are central to Machiavelli’s 
thought. Indeed, my reading of Machiavelli has parallels with MacIntyre’s  (2005) account of practice-
based virtues.  
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always conducive to a virtuous democratic politics, no further justification surrounding the 
need to cultivate and occasionally exhibit hypocrisy is necessary. For, Machiavelli’s defence 
of hypocrisy, I shall suggest, is also sustained by the recognition that it is a ‘lesser’ vice: when 
the alternative to unconditional transparency – which is undesirable and not always possible – 
is to amass support by exhibiting either the cruelty of the lion or the hypocrisy of the fox, the 
latter is often more feasible and alluring than the former. The necessity of hypocrisy however, 
depends on the impossibility and undesirability of perfectly transparent democratic politics in 
the first place – something which moralistic accounts of democratic politics contest. And, this 
question depends on a certain understanding of the realities of democratic politics – the 
context in which democratic politicians operate and the nature of political friendships in 
democratic societies. I shall now outline Machiavelli’s insights on the realities of politics and 
project these on to our seemingly mundane democratic arrangements and rituals. 
 
Leading a Virtuous Political Life amidst Conflict: Machiavelli’s Defence of Hypocrisy  
 
Machiavelli’s case for hypocrisy is advanced in Chapter XV of The Prince, in which he 
signals his intention to ‘depart from the orders of others’ and ‘go directly to the effectual 
truth’ of politics. For: 
 
Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen 
or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one 
should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done 
learns his ruin rather than his preservation … [I]t is necessary to a prince, if 
he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be good, and to use 
this and not use it according to necessity (Machiavelli, 1998: XV, 61). 
 
Whereas for conventional accounts of political morality – those propounded by Plato, 
Aristotle and their moralist heirs – political “virtue is shown in politics”, for Machiavelli, 
political “virtue is defined there (Mansfield, 1996: 22). The standards of political excellence 
arise from within politics, not from an external, abstract moral standpoint. Making sense of 
political ethics, then, requires us to approach politics primarily on its own terms: this involves 
considering more carefully certain ends and goods which are intrinsic to politics and the 
qualities of character necessary for securing these. Differently put, politics should be 
conceived as a distinct practice and way of life with its own peculiar demands – the securing 
of order and stability, the capacity to compete for, rise to and remain in power; to establish, 
secure and maintain one’s state amidst a grubby context ridden with conflicts and power-
struggles.  
11 
 
 
Machiavelli’s thought, I should highlight, challenges the hopeful, value-monist Platonic 
conviction that a morally admirable and a virtuous political life can, at least in theory, coexist 
in harmony. The moralist contention that ‘all truly good things are linked to one another in a 
single, perfect whole’ (Berlin, 1969: x), erroneously entails that the cultivation and exhibition 
of the vices in politics should be always traceable to avoidable, irrational human mistakes – 
conflict and vice are pathologies in philosophical thought, surmountable via the exercise of 
reason. To be sure, Machiavelli does not reject the conception of the morally good man as 
incoherent in toto; he does not deny that honesty, generosity and faithfulness for instance are 
morally admirable and ‘praiseworthy’ qualities (Machiavelli, l998, XV: 61 – 62). What 
Machiavelli (1998, XV: 62) condemns, is the contention that a virtuous politician should 
‘wholly’ possess and display these qualities. ‘If one considers everything well’, Machiavelli 
writes, ‘one will find to be virtue, which if pursued would be one’s' ruin and something else 
appears to be vice, which if pursued results in one's security’ (1998, XV: 62). Thus, in 
delineating political virtue, Machiavelli highlights that moral ‘virtue’ needs ‘its contrary’– the 
‘brightness that comes from contrast with and through the cultivation and occasional practice 
of vice’ (Mansfield, 1996: 18). Virtuous princes should know how to utilize ‘laws’ – ‘proper 
to man’ – and ‘force’ – proper to ‘beasts’ (Machiavelli, 1998, XVIII: 69).  
 
Notwithstanding Machiavelli’s suggestion that a prince should rely on his ‘own arms’ and his 
seeming preference for minimizing dependence and relying on force (Machiavelli, 1998, XII 
– XIV), what emerges from Chapters XV – XX of The Prince, is that neither the minimization 
of dependence nor mere reliance on brute force are always possible or desirable. Whilst a 
virtuous prince should ‘make his own foundations’ and whilst being ‘acquisitive means to be 
acquisitive for oneself’, one ’cannot do everything with his own hands: he needs help from 
others’ (Mansfield, 1981: xix). Relying on one’s ‘own arms’, is not always possible; ‘good 
friends’, domestic and otherwise, are also necessary (Grant, 1997). And, it is in relation to his 
discussion of the prince’s relations ‘with subjects and with friends’, where Machiavelli (1998, 
XV: 62) notes that, whilst a virtuous prince should occasionally exhibit the vices, he should 
also ‘know how to avoid incurring infamy of those vices that would take his state from him’. 
Being perfectly morally virtuous is impossible, but seeming to be so is all-important; wearing 
a mask of virtue is crucial in building and maintaining political friendships (Machiavelli, 
1998, XV: 62; XVI: 65, XVII: 70 –71). Note that this insight is not restricted only in 
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principalities. It also extends to republics7. ‘Force alone’, Machiavelli writes in The 
Discourses, is never ‘enough’ but ‘fraud alone is often found to be quite enough’. And, like ‘a 
prince who wishes to do great things’ should ‘learn how to deceive’, republics are also 
necessitated to employ hypocritical deception ‘until they have become powerful and force 
alone is enough’ (Machiavelli, 1996, II, 13: 155). Rome was exemplary in ‘befriending’ 
neighbouring cities by cultivating trust, faith and feigning virtue to subjugate others, only to 
renege on the alliance when she had amassed sufficient power and the friendship was no 
longer politically fruitful.         
                                                                  
The necessity to forge and sustain political friendships is partly premised on Machiavelli’s 
conception of politics as a grubby domain which is ‘unstable and subject to flux’ (Wolin, 
2004: 202). Hence, Machiavelli does not depart from moralism by merely challenging its 
vision of harmony in individual political morality; he also rejects the hopeful Platonic 
conviction that it is plausible to conceive of a perfect, rationally harmonious society 
(Hampshire, 1989; 2000) – a conviction which, I argue, paradoxically underpins the 
abovementioned moralistic conception of democratic politics. For Machiavelli, this 
conviction is an innocent fairy-tale; turmoil is the natural condition of the political realm; 
political practitioners operate in a context in which ‘all things are in motion and cannot stay 
steady’ (1996, I, 6: 23). Machiavelli’s cosmos is ‘a battlefield’ ridden with ‘conflicts between 
and within groups’, each with its own distinct conception of the good, interests and 
aspirations which cannot be harmonized in any final synthesis (Berlin, 1980: 41). This is 
captured most clearly in Machiavelli’s recognition that, even within a single community, there 
exists a perpetual, insurmountable rift between ‘two diverse humours’ – the people who aspire 
not to be oppressed by the great, and the great who aspire to oppress the people (1996, I: 4 – 
5; 1998, IX). It is this point – Machiavelli’s suggestion that the moralist vision of societal 
harmony is implausible; that agreement on a set of substantive values and aspirations is 
inconceivable – that helps us to capture what is peculiar about political friendships. And, it is 
the peculiar nature of political friendships which creates the impetus to hypocrisy. 
 
What is distinctive of political friendships is that they are forged out of necessity between 
actors with conflicting interests, aspirations and conceptions of the good. Unlike family ties, 
political alliances are about creating politically useful partnerships with people whose aims 
                                            
7
 Note that this point flies in the face of Mattingly’s (1960) claim that Machiavelli wrote The Prince as a satire, 
seeking to challenge the Medici and advocating a turn to republicanism. Machiavelli’s political ethic is 
consistent throughout his work and applies to principalities and republics.  
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and aspirations conflict with your own – ‘with people who are ultimately your competitors’ 
(Grant, 1997: 21). And, unlike private or true friendships which are based on solidarity or 
‘greatness and nobility of spirit’ (Machiavelli, 1998, XVII: 66), political friendships are 
characterized by suspicion, rivalry and contempt8. Hence the oxymoron of political 
friendships: whilst such relationships are marked by competition for power, even the most 
successful prince cannot embark on the quest for politics without allies; ‘finding yourself 
uncovered and without friends’, entails that you shall be ‘ruined’ (Machiavelli, 1996, I, 41: 
90). Political relationships are relationships of power and dependence (Grant, 1997). This 
recognition challenges the Platonic conception of man as an independent, autonomous and 
self-sufficient actor – a conception which also seems to permeate the moralistic account of 
democratic politics. Leading a political life places one under constraints: political actors are 
constrained by the acts and aspirations of their ‘fellows’ and the context in which they 
operate. Politics is practiced within complex webs of dependencies and conflict which virtù 
should exploit. 
 
In contrast to true friendships, a virtuous prince should approach his ‘friends’ with suspicion 
and with the knowledge that political friendships cannot be always sustained and honoured. 
‘A prince who has founded himself entirely on their words’ Machiavelli writes, ‘is ruined’. 
Political friendships ‘are not owned and when the time comes cannot be spent’ (1998, XVII: 
66). Or, he emphasizes later on: 
 
The princes who have done great things … have taken little account of faith 
and have known how to get around men’s brains with their astuteness … A 
prudent lord …  cannot observe faith, nor should he, when such observance 
turns against him, and the causes that made the promise have been 
eliminated (1998, XVIII: 69) 
 
Machiavelli’s account on friendship need not exhaust the range of relationships we might 
observe, in politics or private life. Nor does Machiavelli rule out the possibility of true 
friendships in politics. However, true friendships, by virtue of their rarity and fragility, tend to 
be unattractive models for the prince’s relations. The virtues we associate with ‘an admirable 
private life, such as loyal friendships’, Hampshire writes, engender ‘political powerlessness’ 
(1989: 165). Only an innocent prince relies on lifelong, unconditional loyalties. An 
experienced prince, in contrast, is ‘flexible, not bound by principles or by theories’ 
                                            
8
 This applies to relationships in the domestic and international realm. See Machiavelli’s account of 
the natural ‘enmity’ and ‘hatred’ between the people and senate (1996, I, 4 – 6), between neighbouring 
princes republics (1996, III, 12) and Skinner’s (2000) discussion of Pope Julius’ hatred towards 
Borgia. 
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(Hampshire, 1989: 163). Machiavelli’s warning is clear: the prince must ‘ruin among so many 
who are not good’; and, since your fellows ‘are wicked and do not observe faith in you, you 
also do not have to observe faith in them’ (1998, XV: 61; XVIII: 69). The very features of 
political life which necessitate political friendships – the precariousness of order, the struggle 
for power amidst a grubby domain – render such relationships fragile and hypocrisy 
necessary. This is glimpsed by Leo Strauss: ‘Machiavelli’, he notes ‘contends that the same 
needs which make man dependent on other men compel him to form political societies the 
preservation of which requires the practice of those virtues no less than that of their 
opposites’(1978: 264 – 265). 
 
Hence, it is the recognition that virtuous politics requires forming friendships with agents one 
may despise and that these friendships cannot be honoured, which renders hypocrisy 
necessary. Whilst the prince needs the voluntary cooperation of others whose interests and 
aspirations conflict with his, such cooperation is not always forthcoming. Nor should one 
expect others to adhere to altruism; for, both parties compete for the same, scarce good: 
power. A façade of idealism is necessary even for the most prudential political ethic: the 
prince’s dependence on allies compels him to put on a theatrical act: to flatter them and 
appear before them as morally virtuous and trustworthy. And, if trust constitutes a necessary 
ingredient for such relationships, forging them becomes impossible if one openly expresses 
his disdain or honestly declares his intention to betray them. Building and sustaining political 
relationships requires ‘false’ promises (Machiavelli, 1998; XVIII). The term ‘false’ should be 
underlined. For, an experienced politician, whilst making such promises is aware that their 
honouring is impossible. Machiavelli’s works contain numerous examples whereby ‘treaties 
and promises have been rendered invalid’ via ‘the infidelity of princes’. For instance, 
Alexander VI, an astute fox, ‘never did anything, nor ever thought of anything, but how to 
deceive men’; there ‘never was a man with greater efficacy in affirming it with greater oaths, 
who observed it less’ (Machiavelli, 1998, XVIII: 70). Note that hypocrisy is not a vice which 
should be exhibited just for strategic purposes. Rather, it also enables virtuous princes to 
conceal the rest of their vices and ‘keep dancing’ amidst conflict; leading a virtuous political 
life entails the capacity to manoeuvre amidst the morass of politics and build useful alliances 
by publically pretending to be faithful and loyal, while betraying faith and ignoring loyalty 
when politically necessary. 
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Machiavelli’s argument is not restricted to relations between states or princes. It also applies 
to the prince’s subjects. Since politics involves a perpetual competition for power, one cannot 
virtuously engage in its practice without support from the community. Machiavelli condemns 
‘anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people’ (1998, XX: 86). 
The need to manage public opinion via persuasion is emphasized in the literature on 
Machiavelli and rhetoric (c.f. Zerba, 2004; Beiner, 2008). Whilst the ‘desire of ordinary 
people to escape domination and rule, provides the prince with the occasion to seize power’, 
Peter Beiner notes, ‘once having successfully won the support of the people and displace the 
previous rulers’ the prince must ‘convince the people that his rule will be different – a claim 
which he cannot make good – whilst facing enemies whom he has injured, particularly among 
the nobles, who would like better than to exact revenge’. Machiavelli’s prince ‘must 
constantly replay the moment in which power has been seized’: making enemies he cannot 
eliminate and promising ‘what he cannot provide’ (Beiner, 2008: 71 – 75). Hence the need for 
hypocrisy: a virtuous prince should exploit the gap between moral ideals and the practices 
necessary for securing his state and rule. Since most people cannot accept the truth about virtù 
(Mansfield, 1996) they would be unappreciative if the prince openly reveals his vices, 
throwing their support to one’s competitors who might conceal them. And, given that the 
peoples’ aspirations cannot be fully realized – for, they are incompatible with those of the 
prince and with one another – they must be persuaded that the prince is morally virtuous, 
trustworthy and has their interests at heart. This demands rhetoric and deceptive claims to an 
imaginary consistency and harmony of incompatible interests and aspirations. Hence, political 
friendships are relationships of dependence and require trust but since princes cannot be 
always trustworthy, consistent and virtuous, hypocrisy is necessary. And because a virtuous 
politics requires the appearance of morality and neither our substantive conceptions of the 
public good, nor moral goodness and political excellence can be reconciled in a harmonious 
whole, hypocrisy is inevitable.  
 
Hypocrisy is thus a ‘lesser vice’. Perfectly transparent politics are not politically virtuous. So, 
too, is boundless cruelty. Machiavelli’s concern, Wolin (2004) explains, is to secure the ends 
and goods of politics ‘with an economy of violence’; popular support, if skilfully exploited, 
reduces the need for cruelty. This need not deny the need for cruelty altogether – especially 
when security is jeopardized. However, a virtuous prince should, again, know how to 
‘whitewash’ his dirt. Machiavelli’s praise of Borgia’s capacity to effectively employ cruelty 
and manoeuvre amidst a messy web of dependencies is suggestive. Whilst the imposition of 
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order to Romagna required the utilization of cruelty, Borgia’s dependence on the people was 
such that his cruelty could not be openly displayed – Borgia had to publically pretend to be 
morally righteous. This added a further layer of dependency and hypocrisy: Borgia had to find 
a scapegoat – someone like Remirro de Orco, who would, via hypocritical manipulation, be 
persuaded to carry out the necessary task of imposing order via cruelty and then take the 
blame and be disposed of. Open, unlimited cruelty might provoke hatred – the greatest threat 
for any government – and is incapable of securing some of the goods of politics and 
sustaining a virtuous political life (Machiavelli, 1998, XIX). This would be the lion without 
the fox and it would be lacking in virtù – especially in democratic politics. 
 
 
 
Projecting Machiavelli’s Insights on to Democratic Politics 
 
The obvious domain in which Machiavelli’s insights on political friendships and hypocrisy 
apply is international diplomacy. The betrayals, rivalries and shifting alliances between 
modern states in a realm that seeks to avert the descent into warfare provide a fertile ground 
for illustrating Machiavelli’s ideas (Grant, 1997). This may suggest that, in certain 
circumstances, political hypocrisy is necessary but it does not warrant the more specific 
argument I wish to pursue: that hypocrisy is an inevitable by-product of ordinary democratic 
practices and the glue that holds a virtuous political life together. It is, however, not hard to 
see how Machiavelli’s insights relate to democratic politics. Whilst our politics is seemingly 
more mundane than in Machiavelli’s era, it is no less complex and demanding. Democratic 
politics involves a struggle to secure some level of order and security, to transform power into 
authority, to achieve certain goals and policy outcomes which stem from one’s particular 
tradition or party and to preserve tenure against competition and public opinion (Williams, 
1978, 2002; Philp, 2007). Excelling in democratic politics, requires politicians to ‘compete for 
the limited good of elected office’, to have ‘considerable capacities to win allies’ and ‘make 
good bargains’ (Kis, 2008: 28). Democratic politicians are embedded in complex webs of 
conflict and dependence. The necessity to ‘build coalitions’ and ‘mobilise the base’ 
constitutes the democratic manifestation of the prince’s need for political friends. 
 
But, to achieve anything at all in democratic politics, politicians need the cooperation of a 
plethora of others and are far more dependent than Machiavellian princes. Unable to take their 
support for granted and subject to the frequent rituals of elections, democratic politicians must 
continuously seek the support of the demos and potential coalition partners. And, because 
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politics is an on-going activity, they need to be able to count on that support over time by 
cultivating trust via the difficult arts of persuasion and rhetoric– as opposed to open, brute 
coercion (Kane & Patapan, 2012). However, democratic societies are cultures of subcultures 
and contain a multiplicity of conflicting, irreconcilable traditions (Hampshire, 1989; Shklar 
1984). In complex societies like ours, support can only be cultivated by appealing to diverse 
audiences, whose interests and conceptions of the good conflict and are irreconcilable with 
each other and with those of the politician. Democratic politicians, Hollis writes, have to: 
 
Keep a kind of faith with several groups, who lay conflicting claims of 
loyalty upon [them] … [A] local councillor, for instance, must answer 
doctrinally to party workers in the language of the manifesto, must care 
pragmatically for the interests of constituents with words of common sense 
… must manoeuvre humanely among pressure groups, each with its own 
single criterion of progress …. Each claim is legitimate; each sets a standard 
for what is best, which he will not meet (1982: 396). 
 
Democratic politicians operate in a context where the competing, incompatible claims of 
different groups and traditions render the paying of lip service to values and the feigning of 
virtue difficult to avoid. The impetus to hypocrisy here stems from the recognition that our 
ordinary politics is intertwined with enduring, irresolvable conflicts and difficult choices. Any 
attempt to accommodate the competing and conflicting claims of each tradition is bound to 
result in a messy compromise – the abandonment and betrayal of some of those claims. Given 
that the interests and aspirations of such groups are plural, conflicting and irresolvable 
without remainder, the politician can only (privately) plead that ‘the best is the enemy of the 
good’: securing even the basic goods of politics, requires politicians to preserve a moral front 
and persuade others whom they are dependent on of their ex ante impossible loyalty, 
trustworthiness and consistency.  
 
But the recognition that democratic politics takes place within a context of dependence and a 
plurality of competing traditions casts the necessity of hypocrisy farther. No less fervent a 
proponent of liberal democracy than Shklar (echoing Machiavelli) observes that democratic 
societies are ridden with conflict-prone public figures: ‘we do not agree on the facts of social 
life and we heartily dislike one another’s religious, sexual, intellectual and political 
commitments’ (1984: 78). Members of each tradition are likely to look at each other with 
suspicion and contempt. Political friendships in democratic politics are characterized by no 
less disdain than those between Renaissance princes. The point here is not that such 
antipathies and the messy context in which politicians operate are just practically 
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insurmountable. Rather, as long as practitioners of politics are affiliated with diverse 
traditions and have different life-stories, neither conflict nor political enmities should be 
expected to cease even in theory9. History, Hampshire (2000: 34) notes in a Machiavellian 
fashion, suggests that ‘all determination is negation’: in seeking to distinguish themselves 
from others, groups have defined themselves in oppositional terms: not merely in terms of 
who they are and what they espouse but also in terms of who they are not and what they 
reject. 
 
Pace moralists, the building of political friendships is possible neither because practitioners of 
democratic politics are motivated by a common set of substantive moral convictions or values 
nor because unconditional candour is, even in theory, a political virtue. ‘The democracy of 
everyday life’, Shklar argues, ‘does not arise from sincerity’. Rather: 
 
It is based on the pretence that we must speak to each other as if social 
standings were a matter of indifference in our views of each other. That is, 
of course, not true. Not all of us are even convinced that all men are entitled 
to a certain minimum of social respect … But most of us act as if we really 
did believe it, and that is what counts (1984: 77). 
 
Since our ordinary democratic politics is a logocentric enterprise (Markovits, 2008), the 
cultivation of support and trust necessary is impossible if practitioners of democratic politics 
do not engage with one another in a way that respects the norms of social discourse – even if 
they despise their interlocutors and their values; and, even if they do not agree with such 
norms and customs. Hypocrisy is thus an inevitable by-product of political discourse –in 
particular, the practices of negotiation, debate and the arts of persuasion and rhetoric which 
are inherent in any open, pluralistic and competitive political system. In conditions of 
pluralism and dependence, excelling in such practices requires a certain amount of 
hypocritical manipulation. These practices – and, consequently hypocrisy – are not only 
alternatives to open cruelty, which is politically undesirable, but also to a politics of 
uncontaminated truthfulness which might be equally corrosive. ‘One might well argue’, 
Shklar suggests, that democratic politics ‘cannot afford public sincerity’ (1984: 78). Zealous 
truth propounds validity and demands a once-and-for-all settlement; it possesses an 
undemocratic, apolitical character: it precludes debate, unresolved conflicts and negotiation 
which constitute the essence of ordinary democratic politics. At best, unconditional sincerity 
                                            
9
 Expanding on this is beyond this essay’s scope but this point suggests that the Rawlsian and Habermasian 
conviction that, at least in theory, it is possible to conceive of societal harmony and consensus on certain 
universal substantive values is misplaced. See Hampshire (2000). 
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might lead to a failure to build political friendships and aid the reaching of mutually 
advantageous agreements on matters of shared importance; it might hinder any possibility of 
persuading others to cooperate and endorse (even reluctantly) one’s proposed policies. 
 
This point is captured in Arnold Schwarzenegger’s announcement that, as Governor of 
California, he had to change the way he would speak in public: ‘Attacking people and saying 
‘girlie men’ … I didn’t know any better … I’ve learned that there’s a better way and that is to 
bring people together, not insult them’ (Skelton, 2007; Kane & Patapan, 2012: 71). 
Schwarzenegger, Skelton suggests, upgraded his communication: ‘upgraded as in some signs 
of humility’. Skelton attributes this upgrade to Schwarzenegger’s fruitless acts of transparent 
knavery, which were ‘thrashed by voters in a special election on his reforms’. 
Schwarzenegger’s blatant honesty jeopardized political success – ‘the necessity of selling the 
public on sweeping health care and costly public works programs’ (Skelton, 2007). 
 
At its worst, zealous candour – particularly ‘honesties that humiliate’ – might jeopardize 
public order and civility in a society in which public figures have insurmountable differences, 
antagonisms and deep-seated antipathies (Shklar, 1984: 78). This need not deny that an open 
expression of contempt is always politically inappropriate. But some hypocritical 
dissimulation might often constitute a lesser evil: it might keep conversation going and 
facilitate the building of political relationships and compromise – the advancement of, at least 
some, of one’s policies and substantive aspirations10. 
 
My defence of hypocrisy, I should emphasize, is intertwined with the recognition that 
compromise constitutes an inevitable feature of democratic politics and, perhaps, the only 
democratic way via which politicians can satisfy some of their preferred policies and values 
amidst conflict and dependence. What I seek to clarify though, is that hypocrisy is not just a 
necessary ingredient for effecting compromises and building advantageous coalitions with 
groups one may despise. For, politicians, especially those operating within a democratic 
context, are also dependent on the demos. And, because compromises are intertwined with 
inconsistency and entail the betrayal of some of one’s commitments and values, hypocrisy has 
an additional role to play: it enables politicians to conceal their vices, dirt and inconsistencies; 
to marshal on and satisfy some of the goods of politics. Given that compromise is necessary 
                                            
10
 In contrast to relationships which are not merely instrumentally valuable and which are maintained via 
‘politeness’ – situations whereby one allows others to form their own views despite one’s disagreement with 
these – hypocrisy is useful in building relationships which are valuable largely for instrumental reasons – 
relationships forged between public personas who are antagonistic and who feel disdain towards one another.  
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in democratic politics – especially whilst governing – it is unsurprising that hypocrisy runs 
rampant during election campaigns.  
 
Consider a politician running for President who declares that one of his 
priorities is to reform healthcare … He states his unequivocal opposition to 
any law that requires everyone to buy health insurance, an approach 
favoured by his main rival … He promises that his health care reform ‘won't 
add a dime to the deficit and is paid for upfront’ [and] offers no concessions 
at all during the campaign (Gutmann & Thompson, 2010: 1128). 
 
This example resembles Obama in his 2008 presidential campaign. Whilst proponents of the 
moralistic conception of democratic politics, such as Michael Sandel (2009), saw Obama’s 
election as ‘a great hope for moral renewal’ arising from ‘restless impatience with politics as 
it is’, Obama’s reign was a confirmation of ordinary politics. For, Obama’s pledges to 
healthcare reform were a far cry from the 2010 Affordable Care Act; the latter, was the 
product of a compromise between Republicans and Democrats and, contained elements to 
which Obama was opposed during his campaign11. And, even though the cries of hypocrisy 
were heard loudly, it is hard to imagine political candidates openly proclaiming their 
willingness to betray some of their commitments once elected. 
 
The reason for this is simple: candidates are ineffective in mobilizing support if they talk 
about prudent compromises or honestly confess that their pledges will not materialize tout 
court. Despite our obsession with ‘straight shooters’ (Markovits, 2008) and our apparent 
acceptance of the platitude that democratic politics is the art of compromise, it seems difficult 
for us to trust, let alone to be inspired by, a politician who is openly vicious and transparent 
about her compromises. This is reflected on a recent poll, which reveals that whilst the public 
appreciates the value of compromise in general, it is less supportive of compromises on 
particular issues, such as taxation and abortion (Gutmann & Thompson, 2010). Pace Walzer, 
we may want to know about our politician’s dirt but ‘our agent's [political] duty is to conceal 
it from us’. For, ‘if we know’, the politician ‘has failed’ (Hollis, 1982: 389). Since democratic 
politics involves continuous power-struggles and politicians’ public statements are used in 
that context, sincerely revealing their dirt and vices might be misused against them. No 
politician who wants to rise to power or sustain his tenure can allow himself to speak about 
his vices and dirt without paying attention to the strategic nature of his statements. Virtuous 
                                            
11
 In private, however, Obama declared his willingness to compromise once elected (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2012). 
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politicians should not just get dirty hands; they should also ‘wear clean gloves’ (Bellamy, 
2010: 416). Again, the point here is that support cannot be cultivated without some form of 
hypocrisy – without an appeal to an unattainable idealism or virtue: success in a campaign 
depends on a public reaffirmation of a consistent commitment to core principles or high-
minded ideals, combined with a private acknowledgement that these cannot be fully realized.  
 
More generally, few campaigns would be successful if democratic politicians fail to inspire 
the majority of a nation with a vision of collective hope (and persuade them that they can be 
entrusted with the task of its implementation). But, in societies characterized by deep 
conflicts, ‘there is in principle no basis for collective hope’. For ‘your justice is, not my 
justice; the fulfilment of your hopes is the disappointment of mine’ (Edyvane, 2013: 118 – 
119). Since a homogenous majority based on a harmony of shared substantive values and 
interests is impossible, democratic politicians must cultivate support on the basis of fictitious 
commonalities. Hypocrisy is inevitable the cultivation of support requires the public 
proclamation of, or commitment to, a vision which presupposes shared values, aspirations and 
interests combined with a private acknowledgement of their hollowness – that the vision is a 
fiction and that, at best, its realisation would be shabby and compromised. To refuse to exhibit 
hypocrisy, to borrow Williams’ words, means that ‘one cannot pursue even’ some of ‘the 
moral ends of politics’ (1978: 62). Hypocrisy, to repeat, is not a vice which should be 
exhibited just for purely strategic purposes; it constitutes one of the strings that hold together 
a virtuous political life: it enables politicians to marshal on amidst conflict, to conceal their 
vices and inconsistencies and satisfy some of the ends and goods of politics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay suggested that Machiavelli’s insights on the necessity of political hypocrisy 
constitute a real issue for democratic politics. The oxymoron of democratic politics is that, 
whilst the values of trust and accountability are invoked to vilify hypocrisy, it is partially on 
account of these values which the impetus to hypocrisy arises. And whilst democratic politics 
is thought capable of providing transparent political rituals (i.e. elections and conversation), 
its reliance on such rituals as a means of structuring power-struggles entails that it will 
continue to generate hypocrisy. Democratic politics takes place in a context of conflicting, 
incompatible interests and aspirations and is structured in a way that dependencies conducive 
to hypocrisy are increased. Hypocrisy is a political virtue and the glue that holds together a 
virtuous political life: it enables democratic politicians to mask their inescapable vices, 
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cultivate support and advance some of their preferred policies; it can also aid the maintenance 
of civility amidst conflict. 
 
My argument has crucial implications for the questions of how to conceive democratic 
politics and what it means to lead a virtuous political life in the democratic context – 
questions which have received heightened attention following the recent suggestion that we 
are witnessing a moral crisis in politics; that the shenanigans of our politicians reveal that 
moral virtue has been displaced and should be, somehow, restored. If hypocrisy is a by-
product of democratic politics, refusal to exhibit it is not just intertwined with a failure to lead 
a virtuous political life. Rather, the moralistic quest to extirpate political hypocrisy – a 
yearning which is shared by the dirty hands thesis – can have disastrous implications. For, it is 
underpinned by nostalgia for harmony which misrepresents the realities of politics and the 
messy context in which our ordinary politics is practised. The incompatibility of democratic 
politics with perfect candour is such that eliminating hypocrisy from democratic politics 
would require the elimination of our democratic rituals and political discourse or, at least, the 
creation of a harmonious polity where politics is displaced. The moralist might find this 
vision comforting but such societal harmony is inconceivable; the desire to eliminate political 
hypocrisy altogether might lead to the erosion of public order. The innocent pursuit of utopian 
ideals, Machiavelli warns us, never succeeds in politics. 
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